



DOES OPENNESS IMPLY GREATER EXPOSURE?* 
 
 
César Calderón   Norman Loayza   Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel** 




External exposure can be measured by the sensitivity of first and second moments of economic 
growth to openness and foreign shocks. This paper provides an empirical evaluation of external 
exposure using panel data methods for a worldwide sample of countries. Controlling for domestic 
conditions, the paper examines the growth and volatility effects of outcome measures of trade and 
financial integration as well as four types of foreign shocks: terms of trade changes, trading 
partners' growth rates, international real interest rate changes, and net regional capital inflows. 
The paper analyzes the possibility of non-linearities by allowing the growth and volatility effects 
of openness to vary with the general level of economic development and by letting the effects of 
foreign shocks depend on the degree of trade and financial integration. The findings point toward 
strong non-monotonic effects of openness and external shocks on growth and volatility. 
Moreover, all in all, the results contradict the view that international integration increases external 
vulnerability by hurting growth and increasing volatility or by amplifying the adverse effect of 
external shocks. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A central dimension of globalization is the world trend toward larger financial and 
trade openness, observed in most industrial and developing economies. Financial openness 
has increased from a world median of 5% of GDP in 1970 to 45% of GDP in 2000 and 
trade openness has grown from a world median of 44% of GDP in 1970 to 70% of GDP in 
2000 (see Figure 1 for annual data and definitions). 
More openness implies higher integration of world goods and capital markets, 
contributing to potential gains in growth and welfare. However, more international 
integration could also lead to heightened external exposure, measured by the sensitivity of 
first and second moments of economic growth to openness and foreign shocks. This 
vulnerability may be particularly important in poor countries, due to their production 
specialization, non-diversified sources of income, unstable policies, incomplete financial 
markets, and/or weak institutions. 
A growing empirical literature is addressing the links between openness and 
macroeconomic performance, uncovering complex relationships but offering only partial 
perspectives on them.  In fact, the existing literature does not provide a systematic and 
symmetric empirical analysis of the relationship between financial and trade openness, 
financial- and trade-related foreign shocks, and macroeconomic performance as represented 
by the average and volatility of economic growth.  This paper attempts to fill this void by 
analyzing the experience of a large sample of developed and developing countries in the 
decades spanning 1970-2000.   
The plan of the paper is the following.  Section II provides a comprehensive review 
of the relevant literature. Section III presents the empirical contribution of the paper, 
including its methodology, worldwide data sample, and panel-data regression results for 
average growth and growth volatility. In this section we report first the simple linear effects 
of measures of trade and financial openness as well as four types of foreign shocks: terms 
of trade changes, trading partners’ growth rates, foreign real interest rate changes, and net 
regional capital inflows. Then we analyze empirically the possibility of non-linearities by 
assessing the dependence of the effects of trade and financial openness on the level of per   2 
capita income. Third, we measure the amplification or dampening of the effects of external 
shocks depending on the degree of trade and financial openness. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Review of the Empirical Literature   
 
A growing empirical literature has analyzed the effects of financial openness, trade 
openness, and foreign shocks on growth levels and growth volatility. In this section we 
proceed to review briefly the analytical underpinnings and existing empirical results on the 
core relations that are the focus of this paper: those between financial openness, trade 
openness, foreign shocks, GDP growth, and GDP growth volatility. 
 
A. Financial Openness and Growth 
The empirical literature on financial openness (FO) – as well as the research on 
trade openness (TO) reviewed below – is based on two classes of openness measures. 
Policy or legal  measures reflect policy and regulatory restrictions or barriers imposed 
domestically on international trade volumes and financial flows and/or holdings. In 
contrast, outcome or de facto measures reflect actual trade volumes and financial flows or 
stocks between the domestic economy and the rest of the world. On one hand, the strength 
of the first class of FO / TO measures is that it reflects policy restrictions while the second 
class is influenced by country-specific features – including size, distance, production 
specialization, and risk – in addition to domestic restrictions. Hence the first class may 
represent more exogenous policy conditions while the second class of FO/TO measures is 
likely to be endogenous to variables that are often explained by integration, including 
growth. On the other hand, outcome measures may reflect more truly country integration 
into world markets, while policy measures may not reflect binding policy restrictions and 
may be subject to measurement bias. Moreover, outcome indicators represent continuous 
variables that are more easily measured and are more widely available than the discrete 
measures of policy restrictions. 
  The policy measure of FO is largely based on information on capital controls in the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, which has 
spawned construction of several discrete indicators of capital-flow restrictions on cross-  3 
border or cross-residence flows.
1  The outcome measure reflects an actual measure of FO, 
based on cross-country capital flows or capital stocks, defined as ratios to GDP.
2 
3  
There is a growing literature on the effects of capital-account liberalization and FO 
on growth – Edison, Klein et al. (2002) provide an excellent survey. Here we discuss the 
previous work only briefly, in those dimensions that are relevant to this paper. (See Table 1 
for a selective summary). 
Preceding studies diverge significantly in FO measures, empirical methods, data 
samples, and results. The studies conducted during the past decade – most of them on 
measures based on the de jure IMF restrictions – show mixed results. While Quinn (1997) 
and Edison, Klein et al. (2002) report positive significant growth effects of IFI for the 
world at large, many others do not find any evidence or reject robust evidence of FO 
growth effects, including Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Kraay (1998), Rodrik (1998), 
O’Donnell (2001), Edison, Levine et al. (2002), and Razin and Rubinstein (2004). 
Other studies have tested for FO measures and their interaction with third variables, 
in order to reflect non-linearities and non-monotonicities in the relationship between 
growth and FO. Here the general finding is that FO and external financial liberalization 
tend to reduce growth in countries that are either not industrialized (Klein and Olivei 2000), 
feature ethnic heterogeneity (Chanda 2001), have low income (Edwards 2001), or exhibit 
high black-market premiums (Arteta et al. 2001), while FO raises growth in countries with 
the opposite features. Klein (2003) reports quadratic interaction terms of FO with 
government quality and with per capita GDP, implying that FO only raises growth in 
middle-income countries and reduces growth in low- and high-income countries.  
                                                            
1 Policy or legal measures of capital-flow restrictions include a dummy variable based directly on the IMF 
measure, the Share measure reflecting the number of years of IMF-measured restrictions, and the Quinn index 
that allows varying degrees of restrictions based on the IMF information (Quinn 1997), all available for 
varying country and annual samples. In addition, the OECD computes a measure of capital-flow restrictions 
for 21 OECD countries. Finally, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) compute an index of restrictions for 15 
emerging economies. For detailed discussion of legal and actual measures of capital restrictions see Edison, 
Klein et al. (2002). 
2 Actual measures of FO include large country samples for capital flows (Kraay 1998) and stocks on gross 
capital flows accumulated from flows (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001, 2003, Kose, Prasad and Terrones 
2004). 
3 More partial dimensions of financial restrictions and liberalization, even if they have some bearing for FO, 
are not considered in this paper. Among the latter are measures of stock market liberalization and the 
literature on the effects of the latter on growth, reviewed by Edison, Klein et al. (2002).    4 
Therefore the latter evidence suggests strongly that FO and growth display a non-
monotonic relationship. At low levels of development – for several measures of 
development – financial liberalization and/or FO tend to lower growth, while the opposite 
is observed in developed nations, where FO contributes to growth. This result should not 
come as surprise. It reflects that international financial liberalization in non-OECD 
countries – frequently hampered by low-quality governments, poor institutions, or lack of 
effective banking regulation and supervision – takes place jointly with domestic financial 
liberalization. After the subsequent boom phase of massive credit growth, capital inflows, 
and domestic spending, frequently a hard landing ensues, reflected in a banking crisis and 
domestic recession, and hence depressing medium-term growth. 
Finally Kose et al. (2005) do not find robust growth effects of FO separately but, 
interestingly, show that FO interaction with growth volatility turns the negative effect of 
volatility on growth into a positive one. This suggests that FO may alleviate adverse growth 
effects stemming from high GDP volatility by strengthening access to external counter-
cyclical lending and allowing for international portfolio diversification by domestic agents. 
 
B. Trade Openness and Growth 
Like FO measures, policy or legal measures of TO are based on measures of trade 
policy or trade restrictions and the standard measure of outcome or de facto TO is the GDP 
share of total trade (exports plus imports). 
As compared to the empirical literature on FO and growth, there is a longer and 
broader cross-country growth literature on the effects of trade liberalization and TO.
4 
Again, here we discuss the previous work only briefly, in those dimensions that are relevant 
to this paper. (See Table 1 for a selective summary.) 
Previous work differs strongly in many dimensions – dependent variable (GDP 
growth, per capita income level, per capita income convergence), TO measures, controls, 
data samples, and econometric techniques. Earlier work finds significant, positive, and 
often very large effects of TO on growth, income levels, or income convergence (Dollar 
1992, Ben-David 1993, Sachs and Warner 1995, Edwards 1998, Frankel and Romer 1999). 
Much of the latter research has been subsequently criticized for possible bias stemming 
                                                            
4 Edwards (1993) provides a survey of the older literature.   5 
from endogeneity of trade to income levels or GDP growth, lack of robustness due to 
exclusion of relevant controls and/or use of inadequate data samples and estimation 
techniques. Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000) report that TO effects on growth are not robust to 
inclusion of geographic latitude and Rodrik et al. (2004) find that TO is not robust to 
inclusion of institutional quality. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), based on a technique of 
identification through heteroskedasticity, is the only recent study reporting negative 
significant effects of TO on per capita income levels, controlling for institutions and 
geography. A subsequent study based on the same technique, by Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon 
(2004), shows that TO has positive but small effects on growth.  
In contrast to the latter studies, there is recent research that finds significant and 
robust effects of TO on growth or income levels (Wacziarg 2001, Irwin and Terviö 2002, 
Alcala and Ciccone 2004, Kose et al. 2005). Some other recent work reports more qualified 
results: TO effects are not robust in cross-section estimations but they are significant in 
panel studies and robust to inclusion of institutional variables (Dollar and Kraay 2003, 
Wacziarg and Welch 2003). The latter study, focusing on trade liberalization country 
episodes, shows that trade shares and growth increase significantly and substantially after 
trade is liberalized. Finally, two recent studies look at interaction effects between TO 
measures and other variables. Kose et al. (2005), complementing their research on FO and 
growth, report robust positive effects of TO on growth and find that TO turns the negative 
effect of volatility on growth into a positive one. Alesina et al. (2005), controlling for 
country size and interaction effects between TO and size, find that TO has large effects in 
small countries but these effects become zero as country size tends to maximum size. 
  
C. Foreign Shocks and Growth 
  Foreign variables relevant to open economies comprise financial and real variables 
associated to capital flows and trade flows, respectively. They include price variables 
(international interest rates, terms of trade) and quantity variables (capital flows to 
emerging economies). For truly small countries (those facing infinite demand/supply 
elasticities for their exports/imports of capital and goods), only price variables matter for 
determining domestic performance, including growth. For countries that have some 
monopolic or monopsonic power in international markets – reflecting their size and/or their   6 
specialization in trading differentiated goods under conditions of monopolistic competition 
– quantities matter for domestic performance too.  However, here it is important to isolate 
the exogenous determinant (or the instrument) of quantities as the relevant predetermined 
quantity variable. In this vein, the world or regional supply of capital could be an adequate 
instrument for the supply of capital to the domestic economy, while average growth of all 
trading partners could be an adequate instrument for the foreign demand of exports by the 
domestic economy. 
  Foreign shocks are measured in two ways: the rate of growth or deviation of a 
foreign variable from its preceding level and the standard deviation of the variable in a 
given time period. Most empirical growth studies include one or two foreign shock 
variables based on the first measure, typically as control variables. Here we refer only 
selectively to recent cross-country empirical studies that quantify the effects of terms of 
trade, the foreign interest rate, capital inflows, and trade partner growth on domestic growth 
and growth volatility (Table 1). 
The rate of growth of the terms of trade is the most widely used measure of foreign 
shocks (among representative studies are Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel 1997, Fernández-
Arias and Montiel 2002, Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón 2004, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
2004). In most studies terms-of-trade shocks turn out to be significantly positive 
determinants of growth. 
In a highly integrated world, open economies are also influenced by growth in the 
rest of the world. Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) find that a 1% increase in economic growth 
of the countries’ trading partners leads to higher domestic growth by 0.8 percentage points.
5 
Other studies have included the ratio of private capital inflows to GDP as a growth 
determinant and have also evaluated the impact of different types of capital flows on 
growth (Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel 2003). Most of these studies have found a positive 




                                                            
5 They argue that this result is consistent with the literature on the impact of cross-country spillovers (Arora 
and Vamvakidis 2004, Ahmed and Loungani 1999). 
6 Most of these studies instrumentalize capital inflows using lagged values, legal origin variables or investor 
protection measures in order to avoid endogeneity bias from the response of capital flows to growth.   7 
D. Growth and Growth Volatility 
  Since the influential work by Ramey and Ramey (1995) that pointed out the 
negative cross-country relation between average GDP growth and GDP volatility, research 
has focused on providing explanations and more evidence on this negative relation found 
for the world sample and among low-income countries but not among industrial economies 
(Table 2). Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) provide evidence that measures of 
macroeconomic volatility and low macroeconomic performance have a negative effect on 
growth, hypothesizing that the latter is behind the changing sign in the volatility-growth 
relation between low-income and high-income countries. Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) 
provide robust evidence for the negative effect of GDP volatility on growth. By including 
interaction effects between volatility and relevant variables, they report that the negative 
effect of growth volatility on output is larger in economies with low-income levels and 
weak institutions and policies, and that the negative effect has grown in recent decades due 
to deep recessions. 
 
E. Financial Openness, Trade Openness, and Growth Volatility 
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) explore the sources of GDP growth volatility in  
industrial and developing countries (Table 2). They find that higher TO leads to larger 
growth volatility, especially in developing countries. However they do not find a significant 
impact of FO on output volatility. O’Donnell (2001) finds that larger FO is associated with 
lower (higher) output volatility in OECD (non-OECD) countries. His results also suggest 
that countries with more developed financial sectors are able to reduce output volatility 
through financial integration. 
Kose et al. (2003) reports that none of four FO and TO measures has any robust 
effect on GDP volatility. However terms of trade volatility, financial depth, and M2 
volatility raise output volatility in the world. Bekaert et al. (2004) provide cross-section and 
time-series evidence of the relationship between FO and GDP growth volatility. Using two 
indicators of capital account openness, they find considerable evidence of lower GDP 
volatility after capital account liberalization in the world sample, with somewhat weaker 
results for developing countries.   8 
Cavallo (2005) presents evidence that suggests that TO lowers output volatility in 
net terms. According to the author, this is due to two countervailing effects. Larger TO 
raises growth volatility through the terms-of-trade channel but this is more than offset by 
the finding that TO lowers growth volatility due to lower financial vulnerability to external 
shocks, sudden stops, and currency crushes.  
Finally, regarding the influence of openness on the effect of growth volatility on 
growth levels, we mentioned above the result by Kose et al. (2005) that both FO and TO 
turn the latter negative effect into a positive one. Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004), however, 
reject an ameliorating influence of TO on the negative volatility-growth effect. 
 
F. Foreign Shocks and Growth Volatility 
Foreign shocks – measured as deviation of a foreign variable from its trend or 
average level, or as the standard deviation of the variable – have been shown to be 
significant in determining business-cycle fluctuations of GDP or GDP volatility. 
Kose (2002) evaluates the importance of fluctuations in world prices —fluctuations 
in the prices of primary, capital, and intermediate goods, and in the world interest rate— in 
driving business cycle fluctuations in small open developing countries (Table 2). He finds 
that roughly 88% of aggregate output fluctuations can be explained by world price shocks. 
Rodrik (2001) shows that GNP volatility in Latin America and the Caribbean is driven by 
both external shocks and domestic policy failures – with the terms of trade and capital 
flows as key contributors on the external front. 
Mendoza (1995) was among the first attempts to evaluate the quantitative 
importance of terms of trade shocks in explaining business cycles, using a stochastic 
dynamic small open economy model. He found that terms of trade disturbances explain 
56% of output variation.  
  Early research found that world interest rates do not have a significant role in 
explaining the dynamics of small open economies, including output fluctuations (Mendoza, 
1991, Correia et al. 1992, 1995, Schmitt-Grohe 1998). However, using a dynamic 
stochastic small open economy model, Blankenau et al. (2001) find that world real interest 
rate shocks explain 33% of Canada’s output variation. The above mentioned research by 
Kose (2002) finds that world interest rate shocks account for roughly 1% of output   9 
volatility in developing countries. Neumeyer and Perri (2004) report large effects of 
country risk fluctuations and small effects of world interest rate fluctuations on the high 
volatility of output in emerging economies. 
  Finally, Rodrik (2001) suggests that the instability of private capital flows has been 
the most important determinant of macroeconomic volatility in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the 1990s. Together with per capita income, capital flow volatility 
accounts for close to half of the cross-national variation in GNP volatility in the region 
during the 1990s, compared to 20% in the 1980s. 
 
G. Summing Up and Open Questions 
A rich empirical literature has developed on the relations between TO, FO, foreign 
shocks, growth, and growth volatility. At this stage of the cross-country and panel data 
research we conclude that neither FO nor TO does show a linear or even monotonic relation 
with economic growth and growth volatility. Financial liberalization and FO tend to lower 
growth at low levels of development while the opposite is observed in developed 
economies. In the case of TO and trade liberalization, the non-monotonicity with growth is 
not quite so strong as for FO and financial liberalization, as all studies, less one, show that 
the lower bound of growth effects of TO is zero. Non-monotonicities between openness and 
growth show up as strong interaction effects between measures of openness and various 
measures of development (per capita income, institutional quality, and growth volatility, 
among others) and country size. Yet the discussion about inclusion of adequate controls and 
their possible interaction with measures of openness, and their implications for the 
robustness of the role of the latter in determining growth, is still raging. 
  Regarding the behavior of growth volatility and cyclical output fluctuations, the 
evidence on the effects of FO and TO is contradictory and inconclusive. There is not even 
agreement on the intensifying or ameliorating effects that openness has on the traditionally 
negative relation between growth volatility and growth levels.   
There is much more agreement regarding growth effects of foreign relevant 
variables, particularly the terms of trade. The latter variable is a frequently-used control 
variable in many empirical studies, and is typically found to be positive and significant in 
explaining growth. Some studies also report positive domestic growth gains from higher 
world growth and larger capital inflows.   10 
The existing evidence on growth volatility and cyclical output fluctuations shows 
generally significant and large positive effects of volatility in relevant external variables.  
Therefore, in the light of this review, we conclude that the existing literature does 
not provide a systematic and symmetrical empirical analysis of: 
•   relationships between average economic growth and both financial and trade openness, 
•   relationships between growth volatility and both financial and trade openness, 
•   foreign shocks (financial and real; exogenous price- and quantity-related) and their 
influence on growth and growth volatility, and 
•   interaction between openness and foreign shocks in their effect on average growth and 
growth volatility.  
The rest of the paper addresses these issues. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
We conduct two analogous empirical analyses.  The first focuses on economic 
growth and the second on growth volatility.  In both cases, the dependent variable is 
constructed using the annual per capita real GDP growth rate as the main input.  For 
economic growth, the dependent variable is the average rate of growth over a medium-run 
time window; and for growth volatility, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of 
the growth rate over the same time window. 
  For both empirical analyses, our objective is, first, to study the simple linear effects 
of trade and financial openness as well as of various external shocks; second, to examine 
how the effects of trade and financial opening vary with the level of per capita income; and 
third, to consider whether the effects of external shocks are amplified or reduced by the 
degree of trade and financial openness. By conducting these exercises, we aim to provide a 
comprehensive empirical assessment of openness and external conditions for 
macroeconomic performance. 
 
A. Sample and Methodology 
  We work with a pooled data set of cross-country and time-series observations.  It 
consists of 76 countries and, for each of them, at most 6 non-overlapping five-year periods   11 
spanning the 1970-2000 period.  See Appendix 1 for the list of countries in the sample.  
Appendix 2 provides full definitions and sources of all variables used in the paper, and 
Appendixes 3 and 4 present basic descriptive statistics for the data used in the economic 
growth and growth volatility regressions, respectively.   
We use an estimation method that is suited to panel data, deals with static or 
dynamic regression specifications, controls for unobserved time- and country-specific 
effects, and accounts for some endogeneity in the explanatory variables.  This is the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) for dynamic models of panel data developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).    
The general regression equation to be estimated is the following 
  ' , , , t i i t t i t i X y ε η µ β + + + =             ( 1 )  
where the subscripts i,t represent country and time period, respectively.  y is the dependent 
variable of interest, that is, economic growth or growth volatility.  X is a set of time- and 
country-varying explanatory variables that may include a lagged dependent variable, 
proxies of trade and financial openness, measures of various external shocks, interaction 
terms, and control variables.  Finally, µ t is an unobserved time-specific effect, η i is an 
unobserved country-specific effect, and ε it is the error term.     
The method deals with unobserved time effects through the inclusion of period-
specific intercepts.  Dealing with unobserved country effects is not as simple given the 
possibility that the model is dynamic and contains endogenous explanatory variables.   
Unobserved country effects are controlled for by differencing and instrumentation.   
Likewise, the method relies on instrumentation to control for joint endogeneity.   
Specifically, it allows relaxing the assumption of strong exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables by allowing them to be correlated with current and previous realizations of the 
error term ε .   
Parameter identification is achieved by assuming that future realizations of the error 
term do not affect current values of the explanatory variables, that the error term ε  is 
serially uncorrelated, and that changes in the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with 
the unobserved country-specific effect.  As Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995) show, this set of assumptions generates moment conditions that allow 
estimation of the parameters of interest.  The instruments corresponding to these moment   12 
conditions are appropriately lagged values of both levels and differences of the explanatory 
and dependent variables (the latter if the model is dynamic).  Since typically the moment 
conditions over-identify the regression model, they also allow for specification testing 
through a Sargan-type test. 
 
B. Economic Growth Regressions 
As is standard in the literature, the dependent variable is the average rate of real per 
capita GDP growth. The regression equation is dynamic in the sense that it includes the 
initial level of per capita GDP as an explanatory variable. As additional control variables, 
the regression includes the average rate of secondary school enrollment to account for 
human capital investment, the average ratio of private credit to GDP as a measure of 
financial depth, the average inflation rate to account for monetary discipline, and the 
average ratio of government consumption to GDP as a measure of government burden. The 
regression equation also allows for both unobserved time-specific and country-specific 
effects.   
The explanatory variables of interest are measures of trade and financial openness, 
measures of external shocks, and various interaction terms.  Given that we want to evaluate 
the effects of the economy’s actual contact with international markets, we work with 
outcome measures of trade and financial openness.  These measures are related to policies 
but are also the result of structural characteristics of the economy, such as size, natural and 
social endowments, and public infrastructure.  The outcome measures we use are the ratio 
of exports and imports to GDP in the case of trade, and the ratio of portfolio and FDI 
liabilities to GDP in the case of financial openness.  
We consider four types of external shocks; the first two primarily related to trade in 
goods and the latter two mainly related to financial transactions.  All of them are defined so 
that they can be considered as exogenous to the country in question.  They are the average 
growth of the terms of trade, the average weighted output growth rate of trade partners, the 
average amount of capital flows to the region where the country is located, and the average 
change of the international interest rate.  Whereas the first two variables vary by country 
and time period, the third varies only by region and period, and the fourth varies only by 
time period.  Because of its limited sample variation, the effect of the international interest   13 
rate shock cannot be distinguished from the unobserved time-specific effect; however, it is 
still possible to evaluate the effect of its interaction with the measures of trade and financial 
openness.   
 
Linear Effects of Openness and External Shocks 
In the basic case, the effects of openness and shocks on growth are independent 
from each other and independent from other characteristics of the economy.  This 
corresponds to the most common treatment of growth determinants in the literature.  The 
regression equation we estimate in this case is the following,  
  ' ' ' , , 2 , 1 , 0 , t i i t t i t i t i t i EXT OPE CV y ε η µ β β β + + + + + =         ( 2 )  
where CV is the set of control variables, OPE is the set of openness variables, and EXT is 
the set of foreign-shock variables. 
The estimation results are presented in the first column of Table 3.  We find that 
both financial and trade openness are positively related to economic growth.  As mentioned 
in the introduction, the effect of financial and trade opening on growth is found to be 
ambiguous in the literature.  However, ambiguity gives way to positive effects when the 
time-series dimension is taken into account: the beneficial impact of opening is most 
clearly seen in the experience of countries before and after liberalization (see, for instance, 
Wacziarg and Welch 2003).  Our panel-data results confirm this finding as they are based 
not only on cross-country comparisons but also on over-time changes for individual 
countries.  Furthermore, since our methodology controls for country-specific effects and the 
joint endogeneity of openness, our results are not subject to the criticism that the positive 
growth effect of openness is not robust to the inclusion of variables such as geographical 
location (see Rodrik and Rodríguez 2000 for the case of trade) or is due to reverse 
causation.  
Regarding the growth effects of external shocks, they are all significant and carry 
the expected signs.  That is, increases in favorable terms of trade, in the growth rate of trade 
partners, and in capital flows to the region produce a rise in average economic growth.  
These results together with the estimated size and significance of the period shifts confirm 
the substantial importance of external conditions as growth determinants.   14 
  All control variables carry significant coefficients of expected signs.  The Sargan 
and serial-correlation specification tests do not reject the null hypothesis of correct 
specification, lending support to our estimation results.  This is the case in all exercises 
presented below, and to avoid redundancy we only mention it here.   
 
The Effect of Openness Depending on the Level of Income 
Increasingly there is the notion that the growth effect of openness may not be 
homogeneous across countries.  Indeed, in part motivated by the work of Klein and Olivei 
(2000) in the case of financial openness, researchers have lately considered the possibility 
that the growth effect of opening the economy may depend on country characteristics such 
as income and institutional quality (see Edwards 2001 and Klein 2003).  In the framework 
of our panel-data methodology, we now reassess this possibility by allowing the effect of 
each measure of openness to vary with the level of real per capita GDP, which serves as a 
proxy for overall development.  We do this by interacting each openness measure with 
linear and quadratic per capita GDP (Inc) in each country at the start of the corresponding 
period.  The regression equation we estimate in this case is the following  
  * ' * ' ' ' ' ,
2
, , 4 , , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 , t i i t t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i Inc OPE Inc OPE EXT OPE CV y ε η µ β β β β β + + + + + + + = (3) 
The last two columns of Table 3 present the estimation results.  We consider the 
interaction between per capita GDP and the financial and trade openness variables one at a 
time; we do this in order to both simplify the interpretation of the results and do not 
overextend the parameter requirements on the data.  Thus, column 2 shows the results when 
financial openness is interacted with income, and column 3, when trade openness is 
interacted with income.  Interestingly, the regression results are qualitatively similar 
whether we deal with financial or trade openness and can be summarized as follows.  The 
coefficient on the corresponding openness indicator by itself is negative and significant, 
and the coefficients on the linear and quadratic interaction terms are significantly positive 
and negative, respectively.  Therefore, the growth effect of opening the economy appears to 
depend on per capita income or, taking a broader interpretation, on the overall level of 
development.  A corollary is that the net growth effect could in theory be positive or 
negative, and we should examine which is the case for the actual levels of per capita GDP 
found in our sample.     15 
Figure 2 (a and b) illustrates what the estimated pattern of coefficients implies for 
the change in growth produced by an increase in each openness measure.  Specifically, 
Figure 2 uses the regression point estimates to plot the growth effect of a one-standard-
deviation increase in openness as a function of per capita GDP for the full range of the 
sample.  For both financial and trade opening, their growth effect is nearly zero for low 
levels of per capita GDP, it increases at a decreasing rate as income rises, and it reaches a 
maximum but only at high levels of income (higher in the case of trade openness).  The 
growth effect of rising openness appears to be economically significant for middle- and 
high-income countries.  In relation to the previous literature, we also find non-linear growth 
effects of opening, but we have some differences in the precise nature of the non-linearity.  
For instance, we differ from Edwards (2001) in that we do not find negative effects of 
increasing financial openness for low-income countries; and we differ from Klein (2003) in 
that we find that the growth effects of financial opening remain positive even for high-
income countries.  However, we agree with these papers that middle-income countries can 
expect to improve their growth performance as they become more integrated with the rest 
of the world.  
Our coefficient estimates suggest significant economic effects.  For instance, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the degree of financial openness would lead to higher per 
capita growth rates by: (a) 0.67 percentage points for country observations at the 25th 
percentile of the sample distribution of output per capita during the 1970-2000 period 
(corresponding approximately to Pakistan in the mid 1990s), (b) 0.9 percentage points for 
observations at the 75th percentile (Malaysia around 1995), and (c) 0.8 percentage points 
for countries at the 95th percentile (Italy around 1995).  The highest growth effect of larger 
international financial integration, 0.91 percentage points, is achieved by middle-income 
country observations at the 62th percentile (corresponding approximately to the levels of 
income per capita of Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay in 1995).  
Similarly, an analogous increase in the degree of trade openness will generate an 
increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita of 0.33 percentage points for countries at the 
25th percentile of the sample distribution of output per capita, 0.53 for the median country 
in the sample (Indonesia around 1995), 0.67 for countries at the 75th percentile, and 0.74 
for countries at the 95th percentile of the world distribution of output per capita.   16 
 
The Interaction between Openness and External Shocks 
The previous exercises analyze the potential effect that openness can have on 
economic growth, controlling for various external shocks.  Here we focus on whether 
openness makes the economy more or less responsive to external shocks.  Ideally for the 
beneficial role of openness, it would amplify the growth effect of positive shocks and 
dampen the effect of negative ones.  However, we find no evidence of asymmetric 
interaction effects (in results not presented here) and limit ourselves to the issue of whether 
the economic growth effect of shocks depends on the openness of the economy.   
We address this question by considering interaction terms between each of the 
shocks and the openness variables.  The regression equation we estimate in this case is the 
following, 
  * ' ' ' ' , , , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 , t i i t t i t i t i t i t i t i EXT OPE EXT OPE CV y ε η µ β β β β + + + + + + =       (4) 
There are a large number of possibilities for these interactions, but in order to avoid 
overextending the parameter requirements on the data, we consider the interactions between 
financial and trade openness indicators with the external shocks one shock at a time.  This 
will also allow us to simulate the effect of each shock independently.  The results are 
presented in Table 4, with each column devoted to the interactions with each of the four 
external shocks.  An interesting pattern emerges.  Larger trade openness decreases the 
economic growth effect of trade-related shocks --the growth of terms of trade and the GDP 
growth of trade partners-- while increasing the economic growth effect of financial market 
shocks --international interest rate changes and regional capital inflows.  Conversely, larger 
financial openness increases the economic growth effect of trade-related shocks while 
reducing the impact of regional capital inflows, one of the financial market shocks.  The 
exception to this pattern is that financial openness seems to increase the economic growth 
effect of international interest rate changes.   
Since the growth effect of a shock now depends on three coefficients plus the levels 
of trade and financial openness, it is not immediately clear what the net effect is.  Figure 3 
helps to make this assessment by graphing the economic growth effect of one-standard-
deviation increase in each shock as a function of, first, trade openness and, then, financial   17 
openness.
7  In the former case, we use the sample average of financial openness in the 
calculation of the partial effects; and in the latter, the sample average of trade openness.
8  
The economic growth effect of an increase in terms of trade growth is positive for low and 
medium levels of trade openness; but as this increases further, the growth effect declines 
and may even become negative.  The economic growth effect of the positive terms of trade 
shock increases with financial openness and is positive throughout the relevant range.   
The economic growth effect of an increase in trade partners GDP growth is always 
positive, and, as noted above, it decreases with trade openness and increases with financial 
openness.  In the case of the international interest rate shock, its direct impact on economic 
growth cannot be separated from the time effects; however, based on an exercise where we 
compare the period shifts with and without the interest rate shock interactions, we estimate 
that the direct impact of an increase in international interest rates is significantly negative.  
Once we take into account the interactions, the total economic growth effect of the interest 
rate jump continues to be negative, but it approaches zero as either type of openness rises.  
Finally, regarding the positive capital flow shock, its effect on economic growth is positive 
throughout most of the relevant ranges; but, as indicated above, larger trade openness 
increases its economic growth effect, while financial openness reduces it.  All in all, these 
results challenge the conventional wisdom that trade openness increases the exposure to 
trade-related shocks and that financial openness magnifies financial-market shocks.  The 
channels of transmission seem to be more complex.   
We can use the numbers to draw several quantitative implications. Consider the 
following, for instance.  First let’s consider the growth effects of external shocks at various 
levels of trade openness and given the sample average level of financial openness 
(corresponding approximately to that of India in the late 1990s).  A one-standard-deviation 
decline in the terms of trade would lead to a fall of growth in real GDP per capita of 0.98 
percentage points for country observations at the 25th percentile of the sample distribution 
of trade openness (approximately Pakistan in the late 1990s), 0.50 percentage points for the 
median country (Italy, 1996-2000), and nearly zero for country observations at the 75th 
                                                            
7 Considering their effect on growth, an increase in terms of trade, partners’ GDP, and capital inflows are 
regarded as beneficial shocks in the following discussion, while an increase in international interest rates is 
regarded as a detrimental shock. 
8 For these simulations, we restrict the range of the financial openness indicator to values where the stock of 
foreign liabilities is positive.   18 
percentile (Paraguay, 1996-2000).  Analogously, a one-standard-deviation decline in the 
growth rate of a country's trading partners would lead to a reduction in the growth rate of 
0.96 percentage points for country observations at the 25th percentile of the sample 
distribution of trade openness and 0.78 percentage points for countries at the 75th 
percentile.  Now let’s consider the growth effects of external shocks at various levels of 
financial openness and given the sample average level of trade openness (approximately 
corresponding to Indonesia and Ecuador in the late 1990s).  A one-standard-deviation 
decline in regional capital inflows would generate a reduction in per capita GDP growth of 
0.35 percentage points for country observations at the 25th percentile of the sample 
distribution of financial openness (approximately Algeria in the late 1990s), 0.28 
percentage points for the median country (El Salvador, 1996-00), and 0.2 percentage points 
for countries at the 75th percentile (South Korea, 1990-00). 
Finally, openness and external shocks may have a significant effect on 
macroeconomic volatility, and this in turn has been found to have a harmful influence on 
economic growth (see Fatás 2002, and Hnatkovska and Loayza 2003).  Therefore, there is 
the possibility that the growth effects of openness and external shocks that we just 
described occur through their impact on macroeconomic volatility.  To consider this 
possibility, we add the standard deviation of economic growth as an additional explanatory 
variable.  The results are presented in Table 5, and although growth volatility carries the 
expected negative and significant coefficient, the coefficients on all other relevant variables 
retain their sign, significance, and, to a large extent, size.  Therefore, the growth effects of 
openness, external shocks, and their interactions can be considered independently of their 
volatility effects, to which we turn next. 
 
C. Volatility Regressions 
In this case, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of annual real per 
capita GDP growth, calculated over each 5-year period.  The control variables represent 
some of the main sources of domestically induced volatility and are calculated over the 
same periods.  They are the standard deviation of annual inflation, an average index of real 
exchange rate overvaluation, and the average number of years under systemic banking   19 
crisis.  The volatility regression equation also allows for both unobserved time-specific and 
country-specific effects. 
The explanatory variables of interest are measures of trade and financial openness, 
the volatility of external shocks, and various interaction terms.  The outcome measures of 
trade and financial openness are the same as those described above for the case of growth.  
Note, however, that for growth volatility regressions, the relevant indicator of the external 
shock is given by its volatility.  For this reason, we use the standard deviation of each 
external shock as the measure of interest (and not its average value, as we did in the case of 
growth regressions).     
 
Linear Effects of Openness and External Shocks 
The regression we estimate in this case is analogous to equation (2).  The estimation 
results are presented in the first column of Table 6.  We find that whereas an increase in 
financial openness tends to reduce volatility, larger trade openness increases it.  This would 
indicate that financial opening has an unambiguous beneficial impact on the economy by 
both increasing average growth and reducing its volatility.  In contrast, the effect of larger 
trade openness would be ambiguous as it induces higher but also more volatile growth.  
Regarding external shocks, we find that an increase in the volatility of terms of trade 
changes, the growth rate of trade partners, and capital flows to the region produce an 
increase in the volatility of economic growth.  As expected, then, countries facing a more 
volatile external environment would undergo higher volatility. 
All control variables carry positive and significant coefficients, as expected.  The 
Sargan and serial-correlation specification tests do not reject the null hypothesis of correct 
specification, lending support to our estimation results.  This is also the case in all 
remaining volatility regressions presented below.  
 
The Effect of Openness Depending on the Level of Income 
We consider now the possibility that the volatility effect of openness vary with the 
level of real per capita GDP in the country at the start of the corresponding period.  As in 
the case of growth regressions, we do this by interacting each openness measure with linear   20 
and quadratic per capita GDP.  Then, the regression we estimate in this group of exercises 
is analogous to equation (3). 
The estimation results are presented in the last two columns of Table 6.  As with 
growth regressions, we consider the interaction between per capita GDP and the openness 
variables one at a time.  Figure 4 (a and b) takes the regression point estimates to graph the 
volatility effect of each openness indicator as a function of per capita GDP.  There is a 
remarkable degree of similarity in the pattern of coefficients related to financial and trade 
openness indicators.  The coefficient on the corresponding measure of openness by itself is 
always negative, and the coefficients on the linear and quadratic interaction terms are 
positive and negative, respectively.  All of them are statistically significant.  The interaction 
coefficients indicate that the volatility effect of a change in both types of openness varies 
convexly with income.  The total volatility effect of a change in openness can be positive or 
negative depending on the size of the coefficients, and in this regard the effect of financial 
openness is different from that of trade openness, as discussed next.  
Figure 4 (a) illustrates that a rise in financial openness leads to a decrease in 
volatility at all income levels.  The volatility reducing effect of financial opening is smallest 
in magnitude in medium-income countries and largest at the both ends of the cross-country 
income distribution.  The case of trade openness is somewhat different (see Figure 4 (b)).  
A rise in trade openness leads to an increase in volatility at all levels of national income.  
Poorest countries are the most vulnerable to the volatility inducing impact of trade 
openness.  This effect decreases gradually as national income rises.  Regarding the size of 
the volatility effect, the beneficial impact of financial opening is considerably larger than 
the detrimental effect of trade opening.  This is important to keep in mind when financial 
and trade opening are undertaken together and their joint effects on vulnerability are 
considered. 
  
The Interaction between Openness and External Shocks 
The last exercise considers to what extent the volatility effect of external shocks 
depends on the economy’s trade and financial openness.  To do so, we include interaction 
terms between each of the shocks and the openness variables in the volatility regression.  
Then, in this case the regression we estimate is analogous to equation (4).     21 
The estimation results are presented in Table 7, with each column devoted to the 
interactions with each of the four external shocks.  Figure 5 illustrates how the volatility 
effects of each shock vary with the level of, first, trade openness and, then, financial 
openness.  We find that the interaction between any shock and financial openness always 
carries a significantly negative coefficient.  This implies that financial openness helps 
reduce the volatility effect of all shocks considered, possibly by helping diversify away 
risk.  Trade openness also reduces the volatility effect of terms of trade shocks.  However, 
it appears to increase increases the volatility effect of the growth rate of trade partners, 




This paper tries to shed light on the question as to whether international integration 
increases a country’s external vulnerability.  There are two sides to this question.  The first 
is whether openness by itself hurts macroeconomic performance by decreasing average 
economic growth and increasing its volatility.  The second one is whether openness 
magnifies the impact of adverse foreign shocks and exacerbates the contagion of external 
volatility.  The cross-country and over-time empirical evaluation conducted in the paper 
provides some answers to these questions, and around them we organize these concluding 
remarks. 
First, we find no evidence that financial or trade openness by itself induces a decline 
in economic growth.  On the contrary, there is strong indication that financial and trade 
opening lead to growth improvement.  Granted, this positive impact appears to be small in 
poor countries, but it becomes substantial as the country develops.   
Second, we find no evidence that higher financial openness increases growth 
volatility.  In fact, it appears that financial opening helps a country reduce its growth 
volatility, particularly if its domestic financial system is not in the transitional turmoil that 
characterizes middle-income countries.  Trade opening does seem to increase volatility, but 
the effect is small and only relevant for low-income countries.  For poor and middle-
income countries, financial and trade openness present some trade-offs, but they are mostly   22 
in favor of international integration.  Moreover, as countries develop, the beneficial impact 
of trade and financial openness becomes strong and unambiguous. 
Third, on whether financial and trade openness magnify the growth effect of adverse 
external shocks, the evidence is mixed.  On the positive side, financial openness dampens 
the harmful growth impact of financial market shocks (such as higher international interest 
rates and lower capital inflows) while trade openness limits the adverse effect of trade-
related shocks (such as unfavorable terms of trade changes and lower foreign growth).  On 
the negative side, financial openness tends to exacerbate the growth effect of trade-related 
shocks while trade openness magnifies the effect of falling capital flows. 
Fourth, the evidence regarding the ability of financial and trade openness to limit 
the contagion of external volatility is quite in favor of openness.  With only one exception, 
we find no evidence that openness leads to higher volatility contagion.  It is quite the 
contrary.  Trade openness attenuates the effect of terms-of-trade volatility on domestic 
volatility.  More impressively, financial openness dampens the volatility inducing effect 
coming from all external shocks, both financial- and trade-related.  It appears that financial 
openness (and to some extent trade openness) provides the means for the economy to 
diversify away the external sources of risk. 
All in all, the results presented in the paper cast a favorable light on financial and 
trade openness as engines of growth and stability.  They question the view that international 
integration increases external vulnerability by hurting growth and increasing volatility or by 
amplifying the adverse effect of external shocks.  For future research, there remains to 
understand the mechanisms through which development affects the link between openness 
and growth and the channels by which integration prepares the economy to deal with 
external instability. 
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Table 1
Literature Review on Trade Openness, Financial Openness, Foreign Shocks, and Growth  1/
Authors Main findings  Measures Largest sample
I. Financial Openness (FO) and Growth  
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) [0]: No robust evidence Share measure, other measures Cross-section: 61 countries, 
1971-1994
Quinn (1997) [+] effects Quinn restrictions Cross-section: 58 countries, 
1958-1988




Cross-section: 100 countries, 
1985-1997
Rodrik (1998) No evidence Share measure Cross-section: 100 countries, 
1975-1995
Klein and Olivei (2000) [+] effect of FO on financial depth (FD) in OECD 
countries, but not in non-OECD countries. FD has 
[+] effect on growth 
Share measure Cross-section: 67 countries, 
1976-1995
Chanda (2001) Significant interaction of FO and ethnic 
heterogeneity; FO lowers growth in ethnically 
heterogeneous countries
Share measure Cross-section: 57 non-OECD countries
Edwards (2001) [-] effect of FO and [+] effect of FO interaction 
with per capita GDP; FO lowers (raises) growth in 
low- (high-) income countries.
Share measure (not significant)
Quinn restrictions (significant)
Cross- section: 62 countries, 
1980-1989
Arteta et al. (2001) [-] effect of FO and [-] effect of FO interaction with 
black market premium.
FO lowers growth in countries with high black 
market premiums
Quinn restrictions  Cross-section and pooled data: 
59 countries, 1973-1992
O’Donnell (2001) No robust results for FO and for FO interaction 
with financial depth
Share measure (not significant)
Capital flows (significant)
Cross-section: 94 countries, 
1971-1994
Edison, Levine et al. (2002) Considering interaction with several variables, no 
robust findings
IMF restrictions, Quinn restrictions,
LMF capital flows and stocks
Panel: 57 countries, 25 years
Edison, Klein et al. (2002) [+] in world, OECD, East Asia; 
[-] in non-OECD 
IMF restrictions (share); 
Quinn restrictions, others.
Cross-section: 89 countries, 
1976-1995 
Klein (2003) Quadratic interaction with per capita GDP and 
government quality, only [+] effect on middle-
income countries, [0] for others
IMF restrictions (share); 
Quinn restrictions
Cross-section: 85 countries, 
1976-1995
Razin and Rubinstein (2004) Level of FO has no robust effects on growth but 
switching to capital controls reduces growth
Weighted avge of several restrictions on 
capital-account transactions, IMF
Panel: 100 countries, 1970-1998
Kose et al. (2005) FO has no robust effect but FO turns the [-] effect 
of volatility growth into a [+] one
LM and KPT capital flows  Cross-section and panel: 
85 countries, 1960-2000  
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Table 1 (continued)
Literature Review on Trade Openness, Financial Openness, Foreign Shocks, and Growth  1/
Authors Main findings  Measures Largest sample
II. Trade Openness (TO) and Growth  
Dollar (1992) [+] effect of TO Measure based on international price 
deviations.
Panel: 95 developing countries, 
1976-1985
Ben-David (1993) [+] effects on absolute convergence in income 
levels
Binary measure of trade restrictions Cross section: 1970-1989
Sachs and Warner (1995) TO leads to 2% higher growth than in closed 
economies 
Binary measure of trade restrictions Cross section: 1970-1989
Edwards (1998) [+] effects of eight out of nine TO measures on 
TFP.
9 measures of trade restrictions and trade 
shares
Panel: 93 countries, 1960-1990
Frankel and Romer (1999) [+]: a 1% increase in trade volume raises level of 
per capita income by about 2%
Trade shares  Cross section: 1985, 100 countries
Rodrik and Rodríguez (2000) TO effects not robust to inclusion of other 
variables, including geographic latitude. However, 
lower bound of TO effects is [0]
Broad set of measures used in the 
literature
Several samples according to different 
authors
Wacziarg (2001) [+]: 1 s.d. rise in trade volume to GDP increases 
growth by 1% 
Trade shares Panel: 57 countries,  1970-1989
Irwin and Terviö (2002) Confirms results of Frankel and Romer (1999). 
But TO effect on income per capita income is not 
robust to inclusion of latitude
Bilateral trade flows 8 annual cross sections: 146 countries, 
between 1913 and 1990
Dollar and Kraay (2003) Cross-section: TO is not robust to inclusion of 
institutions Panel-data: TO effects are [+], more 
important than institutions
Trade shares Cross-section and panel: 154 
countries, 1970-2000
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) [0] in cross-section. Updates Sachs and Warner’s 
(1995) liberalization events; trade shares rise by 
5 pp, growth by 1.5-2% after liberalization, 
compared to pre-liberalization period
Trade policy measure and trade shares Cross-section, panel, and country case 
studies: 116 countries, 1950-1998
Álcala and Ciccone (2004) [+] TO effects, robust to controlling for 
institutional quality
Trade shares (in PPP $) Cross section: 98 countries, 1985
Rodrik et al. (2004) TO effects are not robust to controlling for 
institutional quality
Trade shares Cross section: 80 countries, 1995
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) [-] effect on income pc, after controlling for 
geography and institutions
Trade shares Cross section: 86 countries, 1990s
Kose et al. (2004) [+] effect. Changes sign of volatility on growth 
into [+]
Binary trade policy measure. 
Trade shares: not robust
Cross-section and panel: 85 countries, 
1960-2000
Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004) TO has positive but small effects on growth 4 measure of openness: trade size 
tariff indicator, import duties, and BMP
Panel: 100 countries, 5-year periods 
from 1961-65 to 1996-2000
Alesina et al. (2005) [+] and large in small countries, [0] in large 
countries
Trade shares (current prices, PPP $) Panel: 113 countries, 4-periods of 10-
yr avge 1960-2000
III. Foreign Shocks and Growth  
Easterly et al. (1997) [+] and large significant effect on GDP growth Terms of trade changes Panel: LAC and World, 1986-1993
Fernández-Arias et al. (2002) [+] and large significant effect on GDP growth Terms of trade changes Panel: 69 countries, 1961-1995
Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) [+] effect of private capital inflows on growth. 
Composition does matter: FDI is the only 
significant component
Capital inflows and components: FDI, 
portfolio equity, debt and official flows
Panel: 56 developing countries,
1970-2000
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) [+] and large significant effect on GDP growth Terms of trade changes Cross-section: 97 countries, 
1975-1985
Loayza et al. (2005) [+] and large significant effect on GDP growth Terms of trade changes Panel: LAC and World, 1960-2000
Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) [+] and significant effect on GDP growth Trade partners' growth per capita Panel: 101 countries, 1960–1999
 [+] imples a positive and robust relationship found in the literature, [-] indicates a negative one, and [0] reflects the inability of finding a robust relationship
between the variables. 1/ Quinn restrictions based on Quinn  (1967), Share measure is based on number of years of IMF restrictions in place, 
LM is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2002) measure of capital flows or stocks, KPT is Kose, Prasad and Terrones’ (2004) measure of capital flows or stocks.   
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Table 2
Literature Review on Trade Openness, Financial Openness, Foreign Shocks, and Growth Volatility  1/
Authors Main findings  Key Variables Largest sample
I. Growth and Growth Volatility
Ramey and Ramey (1995) Growth and growth volatility are [+]-ly 
correlated among industrial countries, and 
[-]-ly correlated among developing 
conntries




Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) Growth and growth volatility are [+]-ly 
correlated among industrial countries, and 
[-]-ly correlated among developing 
conntries performance and macro volatility 
lower growth.
Mean GDP growth and s.d. of GDP 
growth s.d. of macro policy 
fundamentals and crisis measures
Panel: 56 countries, 
1961-1994
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) Growth volatility lowers growth robustly. [-] 
effect larger in low-income economies, 
and countries with institutional and policy 
weaknesses
s.d. of output gap and of growth per 
capita
Panel: 79 countries, 
1960-2000
II. Financial Openness (FO), Trade Openness (TO), and Growth Volatility
Easterly et al. (2000) TO raises growth volatility, particularly in 
developing countries [0]: FO has no 
impact on output volatility
Growth volatility: s.d. of growth per 
capita
Panel: 74 countries, 
1960–1997
O’Donnell (2001) [-] effect on output volatility of OECD 
countries [+] effect on volatility of non-
OECD countries
Growth volatility: s.d. of growth per 
capita
Panel: 93 countries, 
1971–1994
Kose et al. (2003) [0]: no effect of FO, TO on volatility [+]: 
Terms-of-trade volatility raises GDP 
volatility
Volatility: s.d. growth. TO, FO: two 
(policy and outcome) measures
Panel: 55 countries, 
1960-1999
Bekaert et al. (2004) [-]: Capital accout liberalization lowers 
growth volatility in world sample. Weaker 
results for emerging market economies
Growth volatility: s.d. of growth per 
capita. FO: two measures, IMF and 
Quinn restrictions
Cross-section and time-series: 
95 countries, 
1980-2000
Cavallo (2005) [-]: TO reduces growth volatility Growth volatility: s.d. of growth per 
capita
Cross section: 77 countries, 
1960-2000
III. Foreign Shocks and Growth Volatility
Mendoza (1995) Terms-of-trade disturbances explain 56% 
of output variation
Terms of trade is the ratio of export to 
import unit values
Model calibrated for G7 
countries and developing 
countries
Rodrik (2001) Capital flow volatility accounts for 1/2 of 
cross-national variation in GNP volatility in 
LAC
Private capital inflows Panel: LAC countries, 2-
periods of 10-yr avge 1980-
2000
Blankenau et al. (2002) World real interest rate shocks explain 
33% of output variation in Canada
Model calibrated to Canadian data Model calibrated for 
Canadian data, 1961-1996
Kose (2002) World interest rate shocks account for 1% 
of output volatility in developing countries
World interest rate: LIBOR, deflated 
by export unit value index
Model calibrated for a 
developing, small open 
economy
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) Large effects of country risk fluctuations 
and small effects of world rate fluctuations 
on output volatility in emerging-market 
economies
3-month ex-ante real  interest rate at 
which firms borrow in international 
markets
Model calibrated for 
Argentinean data, 
1983-2001
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Table 3
Economic Growth and the Interaction between Openness and Real GDP Per Capita
Sample of 76 Countries, 1970-2000 (5-year period observations)
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator
Measures of Trade and
Financial Openness:
Constant 7.142 ** 2.105 23.419 **
(2.25)                     (2.57)                     (2.37)                    
Control Variables
Initial GDP per capita  -0.177 ** -0.704 ** -2.883 **
 (in logs) (0.09)                     (0.24)                     (0.27)                    
Education 1.058 ** 2.443 ** 2.062 **
 (Secondary Enrollment, in logs) (0.16)                     (0.24)                     (0.15)                    
Financial Depth  0.631 ** 0.354 ** 0.402 **
 (Private Domestic Credit to GDP, in logs) (0.10)                     (0.15)                     (0.13)                    
Lack of Price Stability -2.275 ** -1.434 ** -1.605 **
 (inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.37)                     (0.43)                     (0.34)                    
Government Burden -1.488 ** -1.184 ** -1.460 **
 (Government Consumption to GDP, in logs) (0.22)                     (0.24)                     (0.32)                    
Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 0.403 ** 0.449 ** -8.214 **
 (Real Exports and Imports to GDP, in logs) (0.13)                     (0.10)                     (0.77)                    
Financial Openness (FO) 0.051 ** -2.274 ** -0.050 **
 (Stock Equity-related Foreign liabilities to GDP, logs) (0.01)                     (0.35)                     (0.01)                    
Openness * Inc ...    0.562 ** 1.832 **
(0.10)                     (0.19)                    
Openness * Inc squared ...    -0.031 ** -0.089 **
(0.01)                     (0.01)                    
Foreign Shocks:
Terms of Trade Shocks 0.038 ** 0.041 ** 0.055 **
 (Growth rate of Terms of Trade) (0.01)                     (0.01)                     (0.01)                    
Foreign Growth 1.536 ** 1.749 ** 1.666 **
 (Growth rate of the country's trading partners) (0.17)                     (0.12)                     (0.11)                    
Regional Capital Inflows 0.098 ** 0.115 ** 0.115 **
 (Private capital inflows to the country's region) (0.02)                     (0.03)                     (0.03)                    
Period Shifts
 - 76-80 Period: -1.119 ** -1.359 ** -1.110 **
 - 81-85 Period: -1.284 ** -1.627 ** -1.099 **
 - 86-90 Period: -1.865 ** -2.322 ** -1.873 **
 - 91-95 Period: -0.517 * -0.832 ** -0.260
 - 96-00 Period: -1.843 ** -2.610 ** -1.609 **
Countries / Observations 76 / 438 76 / 438 76 / 438
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.41)                     (0.18)                     (0.45)                    
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.90)                     (0.94)                     (0.79)                    
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Table 4
Economic Growth and the Interaction between Openness and Foreign Shocks
Sample of 76 Countries, 1970-2000 (5-year period observations)
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
Foreign Shock:
Constant 5.242 ** 12.005 ** 9.444 ** 10.804 **
(2.41)                     (2.94)                   (2.44)                   (3.06)                  
Control Variables
Initial GDP per capita  -0.138 * -0.280 ** -0.176 * -0.152 *
 (in logs) (0.09)                     (0.13)                   (0.11)                   (0.09)                  
Education 1.284 ** 1.419 ** 1.110 ** 0.977 **
 (Secondary Enrollment, in logs) (0.19)                     (0.19)                   (0.17)                   (0.16)                  
Financial Depth  0.592 ** 0.669 ** 0.578 ** 0.628 **
 (Private Domestic Credit to GDP, in logs) (0.07)                     (0.14)                   (0.11)                   (0.10)                  
Lack of Price Stability -1.786 ** -3.936 ** -2.400 ** -2.733 **
 (inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.39)                     (0.33)                   (0.42)                   (0.49)                  
Government Burden -1.597 ** -1.523 ** -1.547 ** -1.384 **
 (Government Consumption to GDP, in logs) (0.24)                     (0.28)                   (0.26)                   (0.23)                  
Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 0.133 * 1.227 ** 0.404 ** -0.190
 (Real Exports and Imports to GDP, in logs) (0.08)                     (0.46)                   (0.12)                   (0.15)                  
Financial Openness (FO) 0.080 ** -0.159 ** 0.071 ** 0.146 **
 (Stock Equity-related Foreign liabilities to GDP, logs) (0.01)                     (0.04)                   (0.01)                   (0.02)                  
Foreign Shocks:
Terms of Trade Shocks 1.175 ** 0.033 ** 0.050 ** 0.039 **
 (Growth rate of Terms of Trade) (0.12)                     (0.01)                   (0.01)                   (0.01)                  
Foreign Growth 1.703 ** 2.756 ** 1.499 ** 1.618 **
 (Growth rate of the country's trading partners) (0.17)                     (0.75)                   (0.16)                   (0.19)                  
Regional Capital Inflows 0.025 0.057 ** 0.086 ** -0.374 **
 (Private capital inflows to the country's region) (0.02)                     (0.01)                   (0.02)                   (0.12)                  
Interaction: Openness and Foreign Shock
TO * Foreign Shock -0.276 ** -0.361 * 0.397 ** 0.151 **
(0.03)                     (0.19)                   (0.11)                   (0.03)                  
FO * Foreign Shock 0.010 ** 0.067 ** 0.118 ** -0.043 **
(0.00)                     (0.02)                   (0.02)                   (0.01)                  
Period Shifts
 - 76-80 Period: -1.239 ** -1.087 ** -5.122 ** -0.993 **
 - 81-85 Period: -1.413 ** -1.290 ** -2.605 ** -1.099 **
 - 86-90 Period: -2.495 ** -1.807 ** -3.443 ** -1.638 **
 - 91-95 Period: -0.564 ** -0.545 * -1.359 ** -0.169
 - 96-00 Period: -1.900 ** -1.911 ** -3.075 ** -1.604 **
Countries / Observations 76 / 438 76 / 438 76 / 438 76 / 438
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.22)                     (0.38)                   (0.37)                   (0.38)                  
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.81)                     (0.59)                   (0.96)                   (0.67)                  
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Regional Capital 
Inflows
[2] [3] [4] [1]
Terms of Trade 
Changes
Foreign Growth
World Int. Rate 
Changes
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Table 5
Economic Growth and the Interaction between Openness and Foreign Shocks: Controlling for
Macroeconomic Volatility
Sample of 76 Countries, 1970-2000 (5-year period observations)
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
Foreign Shock:
Constant 0.139 1.107 2.011 4.385 **
(1.85)                   (1.81)                   (2.08)                   (1.91)                  
Control Variables
Initial GDP per capita  -0.284 * -0.226 * -0.342 * -0.351 **
 (in logs) (0.16)                   (0.13)                   (0.18)                   (0.13)                  
Education 1.233 ** 0.861 ** 0.821 ** 0.836 **
 (Secondary Enrollment, in logs) (0.20)                   (0.12)                   (0.19)                   (0.12)                  
Financial Depth  0.670 ** 0.826 ** 1.080 ** 0.972 **
 (Private Domestic Credit to GDP, in logs) (0.18)                   (0.15)                   (0.18)                   (0.16)                  
Lack of Price Stability -0.390 -1.138 ** -0.522 * -0.999 **
 (inflation rate, in log[100+inf.rate]) (0.32)                   (0.17)                   (0.35)                   (0.23)                  
Government Burden -1.622 ** -1.583 ** -1.660 ** -1.345 **
 (Government Consumption to GDP, in logs) (0.26)                   (0.22)                   (0.30)                   (0.22)                  
Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 0.573 ** 1.380 ** 0.616 ** 0.118
 (Real Exports and Imports to GDP, in logs) (0.13)                   (0.33)                   (0.13)                   (0.15)                  
Financial Openness (FO) 0.029 ** -0.203 ** 0.034 ** 0.111 **
 (Stock Equity-related Foreign liabilities to GDP, logs) (0.01)                   (0.03)                   (0.01)                   (0.01)                  
Foreign Shocks:
Terms of Trade Shocks 0.917 ** 0.038 ** 0.042 ** 0.036 **
 (Growth rate of Terms of Trade) (0.15)                   (0.01)                   (0.01)                   (0.01)                  
Foreign Growth 1.457 ** 2.573 ** 1.457 ** 1.477 **
 (Growth rate of the country's trading partners) (0.17)                   (0.50)                   (0.16)                   (0.16)                  
Regional Capital Inflows 0.029 0.049 ** 0.063 ** -0.233 *
 (Private capital inflows to the country's region) (0.03)                   (0.02)                   (0.03)                   (0.14)                  
Interaction: Openness and Foreign Shock
TO * Foreign Shock -0.215 ** -0.346 ** 0.311 ** 0.105 **
(0.04)                   (0.12)                   (0.13)                   (0.04)                  
FO * Foreign Shock 0.004 ** 0.089 ** 0.101 ** -0.039 **
(0.00)                   (0.01)                   (0.02)                   (0.01)                  
MacroeconomicVolatility
Std. Dev. Growth -0.380 ** -0.401 ** -0.354 ** -0.395 **
(0.02)                   (0.02)                   (0.02)                   (0.02)                  
Period Shifts
 - 76-80 Period: -1.324 ** -1.187 ** -4.458 ** -1.252 **
 - 81-85 Period: -1.704 ** -1.491 ** -2.587 ** -1.486 **
 - 86-90 Period: -2.624 ** -2.099 ** -3.512 ** -2.043 **
 - 91-95 Period: -0.974 ** -0.629 * -1.306 ** -0.497
 - 96-00 Period: -2.457 ** -2.173 ** -3.200 ** -2.093 **
Countries / Observations 76 / 438 76 / 438 76 / 438 76 / 438
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.22)                   (0.27)                   (0.24)                   (0.46)                  
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.94)                   (0.62)                   (0.78)                   (0.74)                  
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Terms of Trade 
Changes
Foreign Growth




[1] [2] [3] [4]
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Table 6
Growth Volatility, Trade Openness, Financial Openness and Foreign Shocks
Sample of 76 Countries, 1970-2000 (5-year period observations)
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Growth in Real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
Measures of Trade and
Financial Openness:
Constant -0.682 ** -1.254 ** 0.773 *
(0.30)                     (0.37)                     (0.44)                    
Control Variables
Inflation Volatility 0.006 ** 0.007 ** 0.005 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of CPI) (0.00)                     (0.00)                     (0.00)                    
RER Overvaluation 0.004 ** 0.003 ** 0.003 **
 (Proportional index, overvaluation if >100) (0.00)                     (0.00)                     (0.00)                    
Systemic Banking Crises 1.303 ** 1.341 ** 0.973 **
 (Frequency of years under crises: 0-1) (0.13)                     (0.14)                     (0.14)                    
Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 0.543 ** 0.664 ** -0.658 *
 (Real Exports and Imports to GDP, in logs) (0.07)                     (0.08)                     (0.39)                    
Financial Openness (FO) -0.088 ** -4.206 ** -0.097 **
 (Stock Equity-related Foreign liabilities to GDP, logs) (0.01)                     (0.32)                     (0.01)                    
Openness * Inc ...    0.977 ** 0.277 **
(0.09)                     (0.11)                    
Openness * Inc squared ...    -0.057 ** -0.020 **
(0.01)                     (0.01)                    
Volatility of Foreign Shocks
Volatility of Terms of Trade Changes 0.075 ** 0.075 ** 0.072 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of ToT) (0.00)                     (0.00)                     (0.00)                    
Volatility of Foreign Growth Volatility 0.246 ** 0.312 ** 0.109
 (S.D. annual log differences of Foreign Growth) (0.07)                     (0.07)                     (0.12)                    
Volatility of Regional Capital Inflows 0.350 ** 0.332 ** 0.322 **
 (S.D. ratio of Regional Capital Flows to GDP) (0.04)                     (0.04)                     (0.04)                    
Period Shifts
 - 81-85 Period: -0.286 -0.093 -0.081
 - 86-90 Period: -0.533 -0.339 ** -0.436 **
 - 91-95 Period: -0.223 -0.053 -0.096
 - 96-00 Period: -1.101 ** -0.869 ** -0.977 **
Countries / Observations 76 / 371 76 / 371 76 / 371
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.21)                     (0.728)                   (0.518)                  
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.92)                     (0.855)                   (0.990)                  
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Table 7
Growth Volatility and the Interaction between Openness and the Volatility of Foreign Shocks
Sample of 76 Countries, 1970-2000 (5-year period observations)
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Growth in Real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
Foreign Shock:
Constant -2.005 ** 1.995 ** -0.142 -1.917 **
(0.32)                   (0.67)                   (0.41)                   (0.44)                  
Control Variables
Inflation Volatility 0.007 ** 0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.008 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of CPI) (0.00)                   (0.00)                   (0.00)                   (0.00)                  
RER Overvaluation 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 0.004 ** 0.002 **
 (Proportional index, overvaluation if >100) (0.00)                   (0.00)                   (0.00)                   (0.00)                  
Systemic Banking Crises 1.346 ** 1.360 ** 1.228 ** 1.391 **
 (Frequency of years under crises: 0-1) (0.10)                   (0.12)                   (0.14)                   (0.10)                  
Openness:
Trade Openness (TO) 0.941 ** -0.266 * 0.438 ** 0.919 **
 (Real Exports and Imports to GDP, in logs) (0.08)                   (0.16)                   (0.13)                   (0.11)                  
Financial Openness (FO) -0.092 ** -0.018 -0.018 -0.138 **
 (Stock Equity-related Foreign liabilities to GDP, logs) (0.01)                   (0.02)                   (0.01)                   (0.01)                  
Volatility of Foreign Shocks
Volatility of Terms of Trade Changes 0.079 ** 0.077 ** 0.074 ** 0.072 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of ToT) (0.00)                   (0.00)                   (0.00)                   (0.00)                  
Volatility of Foreign Growth Volatility 0.237 ** -2.147 ** 0.432 ** 0.315 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of Foreign Growth) (0.07)                   (0.50)                   (0.10)                   (0.07)                  
Volatility of Regional Capital Inflows 0.325 ** 0.413 ** 0.331 ** 0.366 *
 (S.D. ratio of Regional Capital Flows to GDP) (0.03)                   (0.05)                   (0.04)                   (0.23)                  
Interaction: Openness and Vol. Foreign Shock
TO * Vol(Foreign Shock) -0.010 ** 0.727 ** -0.128 0.005
(0.00)                   (0.12)                   (0.15)                   (0.06)                  
FO * Vol(Foreign Shock) -0.006 ** -0.146 ** -0.152 ** -0.019 **
(0.00)                   (0.02)                   (0.01)                   (0.00)                  
Period Shifts
 - 81-85 Period: -0.361 ** -0.181 ** 0.217 -0.315 **
 - 86-90 Period: -0.587 ** -0.461 ** -0.372 ** -0.523 **
 - 91-95 Period: -0.366 ** -0.187 ** 0.162 -0.221 **
 - 96-00 Period: -1.289 ** -0.904 ** -1.250 ** -1.111 **
Countries / Observations 76 / 371 76 / 371 76 / 371 76 / 371
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.22)                   (0.37)                   (0.48)                   (0.19)                  
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.85)                   (0.86)                   (0.84)                   (0.88)                  
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Terms of Trade 
Changes
Foreign Growth
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Figure 1
Trends in Openness, 1970-2000
Note: Openness measures are defined as the ratio of real exports and imports to GDP (trade) and equity-based foreign liabilities fo GDP (financial).
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Figure 2
Growth Effect of Openness as a function to GDP per capita  1/
1/ Growth effect of a one standard deviation increase in financial and trade openness. See Table A.3 for the computed standard deviations.
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    Figure 3
Growth Effect of External Shocks as a Function of Openness 1/
      (a) Growth Effect of Terms of Trade Changes
      (b) Growth Effect of Foreign Growth
(c) Growth Effect of World Interest Rate Changes
(d) Growth Effect of Regional Capital Flows
1/ Growth effect of a one standard deviation increase in the corresponding external shock. See Table A.3 for the computed standard deviations of these shocks.
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Figure 4
Volatility Effect of Openness as a function to GDP per capita  1/
1/ Volatility effect of a one standard deviation increase in financial and trade openness. See Table A.4 for the computed standard deviations.
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    Figure 5
Volatility Effect of External Shocks as a Function of Openness  1/
(a) Volatility Effect of Volatility in Terms of Trade Changes
(b) Volatility Effect of Volatility of Foreign Growth 
(c) Volatility Effect of Volatility of World Interest Rate Changes
(d) Volatility Effect of Volatility of Regional Capital Flows
1/ Volatility effect of a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of the external shock. See Table A.4 for the computed standard deviations of these shocks.
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Appendix 1: Sample of countries






Finland Japan United Kingdom
France Netherlands United States
New Zealand
II. Latin America and the Caribbean (21 countries)
Argentina Ecuador Nicaragua
Bolivia El Salvador Panama
Brazil Guatemala Paraguay
Chile Haiti Peru
Colombia Honduras Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica Jamaica Uruguay
Dominican Republic Mexico Venezuela, RB
III. East Asia and the Pacific (8 countries)
China Malaysia Singapore
Indonesia Papua New Guinea Thailand
Korea, Rep. Philippines
IV. Middle East and North Africa (7 countries)
Algeria Israel Tunisia
Egypt, Arab Rep. Jordan Turkey
Morocco
V. South Asia (3 countries)
India Pakistan Sri Lanka
VI. Sub-Saharan Africa (15 countries)
Botswana Madagascar Sierra Leone
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi South Africa
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Appendix 2: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
GDP per capita Ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is in 1985 PPP-
adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991) 
and The World Bank (2003).
GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP per capita. Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991) 
and The World Bank (2003).
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is 
in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991) 
and The World Bank (2003).
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to that 
level of education. 
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World Bank 
(2003).
Financial Depth Ratio of domestic credit claims on private sector to GDP  Author’s calculations using data from IFS, the
publications of the Central Bank and PWD. The method
of calculations is based on Beck, Demiguc-Kunt and
Levine (1999).
Trade Openness Log of the ratio of exports and imports (in 1995 US$) to 
GDP (in 1995 US$).
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World Bank 
(2003).
Financial Openness Log of the Stock of Equity-based Foreign Liabilities to GDP 
(both expressed in 1995 US$). Following Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1998), we add the value of 1 to the stock in order to 
include the cases where the stock of foreign liabilities is 0.
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001, 2003),  IMF's Balance of 
Payments Statistics
Government Burden Log of the Ratio of government consumption to GDP. The World Bank (2003).
CPI Consumer price index (1995 = 100) at the end of the year Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Inflation rate Log differences of CPI Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Real Exchange Rate 
Overvaluation
Real Effective Exchange Rate, with the level adjusted such 
that the average for 1976-85 equals Dollar's (1992) index of 
overvaluation (based on the ratio of actual to income-
adjusted Summers-Heston purchasing power parity 
comparisons).
Easterly (2001)
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index (1995=100) The World Bank (2003).
Terms of Trade Changes Log differences of the terms of trade index Authors' construction using The World Bank (2003).
Foreign Growth Growth of main trading partners calculated as the trade-
weighted growth for the main trading partners of the 
corresponding country.
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991), The World Bank (2003), and the IMF's 
Direction of Trade Statistics.
World Nominal Interest 
Rate
G-3 (U.S., Germany and Japan) Money Market Rate (period 
average)
Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
World Inflation G-3 (U.S., Germany and Japan) Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Inflation rate
Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
World Real Interest Rate World Nominal Interest Rate adjusted by World Inflation. Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Regional Capital Inflows (Gross) Capital Inflows (FDI, portofolio-equity, loans) to the
region of the corresponding country, as a percentage to the
corresponding GDP.
Author’s calculations with data from the IMF's Balance 
of Payments Statistics.
Inflation Volatility Standard deviation of the annual log differences of CPI Authors' construction using The World Bank (2003).
Systemic Banking Crises Number of years in which a country underwent systemic
banking crisis, as a fraction of years in the corresponding
period.
Author's calculations using data from Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1999), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998).
Volatility of Terms of 
Trade Changes
Standard deviation of the annual log differences of the terms
of trade.
Authors' construction using The World Bank (2003).
Volatility of Foreign 
Growth
Standard deviation of the trade-weighted annual growth of
the main trading partners of the corresponding country.
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston 
(1991), The World Bank (2003), and the IMF's 
Direction of Trade Statistics.
Volatility of World Real 
Interest Rates
Standard deviation of the world real interest rate annual
changes.
Author’s calculations with data from the IMF's Balance 
of Payments Statistics.
Volatility of Regional 
Capital Inflows
Standard deviation of the capital inflows to region of the
corresponding country relative to its regional GDP.
Author’s calculations with data from the IMF's Balance 
of Payments Statistics.
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Authors’ construction.  
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics for Growth Regressions
Data in 5-year period averages, 76 countries, 438 observations
(a) Univariate
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Growth rate of GDP per capita 1.422 2.642 -7.944 10.128
Initial GDP per capita (in logs) 8.522 0.989 6.243 10.240
Secondary enrollment (in logs) 3.739 0.788 0.113 4.923
Private domestic credit/GDP (in logs) 3.485 0.844 0.568 5.435
Inflation  (in log [100+inf. rate]) 4.743 0.175 4.585 6.135
Government consumption /GDP (in logs) 2.680 0.371 1.475 3.637
Trade Openness 3.948 0.594 2.024 5.787
Financial Openness 1.689 3.779 -21.044 5.536
Terms of Trade Changes -0.424 4.644 -18.859 21.415
Foreign Growth 2.244 0.606 0.834 3.833
World Int. Rate Changes -0.017 0.658 -0.975 1.505
Regional Capital Flows / GDP 3.419 2.359 -1.635 10.336
(b) Bivariate Correlations between Growth and Determinants
Variable
Growth rate of 
GDP per capita





























Growth rate of GDP per capita 1.00
Initial GDP per capita (in logs) 0.19 1.00
Secondary enrollment (in logs) 0.22 0.80 1.00
Private domestic credit/GDP (in logs) 0.25 0.71 0.61 1.00
Inflation  (in log [100+inf. rate]) -0.29 -0.10 0.00 -0.35 1.00
Government consumption /GDP (in logs) -0.03 0.36 0.29 0.35 -0.10 1.00
Trade Openness -0.04 -0.14 -0.13 0.01 -0.30 0.27 1.00
Financial Openness 0.15 0.34 0.44 0.28 0.04 0.03 -0.11 1.00
Terms of Trade Changes 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.08 0.06 1.00
Foreign Growth 0.28 -0.14 -0.24 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.23 0.08 1.00
World Int. Rate Changes 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.20 0.29 1.00
Regional Capital Inflows / GDP 0.19 0.44 0.34 0.41 -0.29 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.11 -0.14 0.06 1.00
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Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics for Growth Volatility Regressions
Data in 5-year period averages, 76 countries, 371 observations
(a) Univariate
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Growth Volatility 2.887 2.190 0.314 16.053
Inflation Volatility 8.681 19.193 0.198 168.127
RER Overvaluation 107.417 44.123 47.192 555.027
Systemic Banking Crises 0.138 0.286 0.000 1.000
Trade Openness 3.968 0.569 2.249 5.781
Financial Openness 2.085 3.027 -21.044 5.536
Volatility of Terms of Trade Changes 8.476 8.628 0.000 56.323
Volatility of Foreign Growth 1.000 0.434 0.214 2.438
Volatility of World Int. Rate Changes 1.056 0.737 0.303 2.849
Volatility of Regional Capital Inflows/GDP 1.424 0.969 0.139 4.444
(b) Bivariate Correlations between Growth Volatility and Determinants
Variable














World Int. Rate 
Changes
Volatility of Regional 
Capital Inflows/GDP
Growth Volatility 1.00
Inflation Volatility 0.24 1.00
RER Overvaluation 0.08 0.13 1.00
Systemic Banking Crises 0.11 0.24 0.04 1.00
Trade Openness 0.05 -0.24 0.09 -0.09 1.00
Financial Openness -0.30 -0.03 -0.09 0.07 -0.05 1.00
Volatility of Terms of Trade Changes 0.36 0.27 0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.30 1.00
Volatility of Foreign Growth 0.18 0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.15 -0.18 0.12 1.00
Volatility of World Int. Rate Changes 0.15 0.02 -0.05 -0.16 -0.13 -0.24 0.15 0.87 1.00
Volatility of Regional Capital Inflows/GDP 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.23 1.00
 
 
 